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IN rfHE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GENE vVHEADON and 
DEANE WHEADON, his wife, 
Pluintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
GEORGE B. PEARSON and 
SARAH K. PEARSON, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9696 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The plaintiffs respectfully petition the Court for a 
rehearing of the issues presented to the Court on this 
appeal, for the reasons hereafter set forth. 
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I 
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO 
JOIN T'HE CLAIMS IN QUESTION AND SHOULD NOT 
BE PENALIZED FOR NOT DOING SO. 
The under lying rationale of the Court's opinion on 
this appeal apparently is that because plaintiffs were per-
mitted under our rules to join both of the causes of action 
in question in one lawsuit, they were required to do so. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decisions from other 
jurisdictions, including those whose rules are similar to 
ours, are to the contrary. 
For example, the annotation at 86 ALR 2d 1385 
collects a number of cases in which courts have held that 
an action for malicious prosecution and an action for false 
arrest involve different causes of action and that a plain-
tiff, having either succeeded or failed in the one, may 
maintain the other in a separate suit. The case which 
leads the annotation is an especially strong holding to 
that effect. Two of the decisions collected are from fed-
eral district courts, operating under rules substantially 
identical to ours. 
In one of these, Gore v. Gorman's, Inc. (1956, DC 
Mo) 148 F Supp 241, the defendant had procured plaintiff's 
arrest on an alleged insufficient funds check in an effort 
to collect an account which plaintiff owed defendant. 
Plaintiff then sued defendant on a malicious prosecution 
cause of action and recovered judgment, which was satis-
fied. Plaintiff then brought the above-cited action, a 
second and separate suit, on an abuse of process cause of 
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action. The defendant claimed the former suit was a bar. 
The court held that it was not, stating (at p. 244): 
As to contention "2"-that the action is res judicata 
-or barred by the judgment heretofore entered, 
it is the opinion of the court that the action sought 
to be maintained against the defendants at this 
time is entirely separate and distinct from the 
cause of action heretofore prosecuted against the 
defendants, although some of the relevant facts 
were considered in that case. Certainly there is a 
distinction between an action for malicious prose-
cution, and an action for abuse of process, for even 
false arrest, and the plaintiff had a right to main-
tain the actions separate and distinct from each 
other. That contention must be ruled against the 
said defendants. (Emphasis added) 
The second such case is Robinson v. Chicago Great 
Western R. Co. (1956, DC Mo) 144 F Supp 713, where the 
plaintiff brought a second suit for false imprisonment, 
having previously secured judgment against the same de-
fendant for malicious prosecution. The court first pointed 
out that the causes of action for malicious prosecution and 
false imprisonment were quite different, comprised of 
different elements and, among other things, subject to 
different defenses. After some discussion of election of 
remedies, the court stated (at p. 716): 
If plaintiff, through misconception or mistake, 
pursues an action' for false imprisonment, and ul-
timately loses, he should not be barred from pros-· 
ecuting an action based upon the correct theory. 
There is no substantial reason why plaintiff in 
good faith <mnnat pursUle two apparent, but incen-
sistenrt,~ theories up to such· time as. all ueasonable 
uncertainty disappears as to. which theory or eause 
of action fs the correct one. The reason given in 
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support of this rule is that the prosecution of a 
wrong remedy to defeat will not estop a party 
from subsequently pursuing the right one to vic-
tory. 
Both foregoing cases were decided by courts operating 
under Rule 18(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
its provisions are identical with the provisions of Rule 
18(a), U.R.C.P. It is respectfully submitted that since we 
are dealing in this case with separate and distinct causes 
of action rather than with different statements of the 
same cause of action, Rule 18(a) is the one more directly 
in point. 
By comparison with the foregoing, the facts of the 
instant case are a fortiori in favor of the plaintiffs. In 
those cases, the causes of action arose out of the same 
identical transaction or occurrence; in this case the facts 
giving rise to the causes of action are distinct, and sepa-
rated in time. 
II 
THE DECISION DEPARTS FROM THE FORMER 
HOLDINGS OF THIS COURT. 
In the opinion filed in this case, the Court quotes and 
emphasizes certain language from its decision in the East 
Mill Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City case, 108 U. 315, 
159 P. 2d 863. Within the same quote, but not emphasized, 
is the language which seems to reach the heart of this 
case. In stating that res judicata "applies not only to 
points and issues which are actually raised and decided 
therein, but also to such as could have been therein adju-
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dicated," did not the Court mean points and issues pertain-
ing to that cause of action, as stated by those pleadings? 
If not, why the following language " ... but it only 
applies where the claim, demand, or cause of action is the 
same in both cases."? 
In a 1955 case, Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, 4 
U. 2d 137, 289 P. 2d 196, this Court, through Mr. Justice 
Crockett, adopted the following statement from a case 
decided by the United States Supreme Court: 
But where the second action between the same 
parties is upon a different claim or demand, the 
judgment in the prior action operates as an estop-
pel only as to those matters in issue or points 
controverted, upon the determination of which 
the finding or verdict was rendered. In all cases, 
therefore, where it is sought to apply the estoppel 
of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action 
to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause 
of action, the inquiry must always be as to the point 
or question actually litigated and determined in the 
original action, not what might have been thus liti-
gated and determined. Only upon such matters is 
the judgment conclusive in another action. (Em-
phasis added) 
To say that a judgment is res judicata as to all mat-
ters that could have been adjudicated, without limiting it 
to those points relevant to the cause of action stated in 
the pleadings, a~ounts to compulsory joinder and makes 
a shambles of Rule 18(a). 
Mr. Cleary makes this point in his article, cited by 
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the court. Cleary, Res Judicata Re-examined, 57 Yale L.J. 
339, He says, at p. 346: 
Here it is important to distinguish compulsory 
joinder from permissive joinder of the subject 
matter of litigation. A literal reading of the rule 
that res judicata applies not only to what was liti-
gated but to what might have been litigated, as 
well, would mean that all procedurally joinable 
matters between the parties at the time of the 
former action would now be res judicata, regard-
less of how unrelated such matters might be in 
fact. Courts have not gone to that length. They 
have said that what might have been litigated in 
the first action is res judicata only to the extent 
that it constituted a part of the cause of action 
involved in the first action. If the causes of action 
are different, it is immaterial then that plaintiff 
might have joined them under rules governing 
permissive joinder. Now the purpose of liberality 
in joinder rules is the same as the anti-vexatious-
litigation purpose of the rule of res judicata, i.e. to 
encourage litigants to reduce the numerical volume 
of lawsuits by bringing more disputed matters into 
the same action. Yet when plaintiff seeks to make 
two lawsuits do the work of one, the rule of res 
judicata applies too harsh a penalty (complete loss 
of plaintiff's right of recovery), and permissive 
joinder too slight a penalty (some added inconven-
ience and expense to plaintiff, which he incurs 
voluntarily). And so we find a deserving plaintiff 
denied recovery of very apparent damages for 
breach of contract because the contract was "en-
tire,'' and in a former action he had not included 
damages for anticipatory breach, thus "splitting his 
cause of action," while in another case plaintiff is 
permitted to bring as many actions as he holds 
bonds and coupons of the same identical issue, 
because each bond and coupon "constitutes a sep-
arate cause of action."' 
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SUMMARY 
The facts, transactions, occurrences, or whatever they 
might be called, which gave rise to plaintiffs' cause of ac-
tion as asserted in this suit were wholly prior in time and 
separate from those which gave rise to the prescriptive 
right cause of action set forth in their first suit. The de-
fendants have not been troubled by "vexatious litigation" 
since the matter was first disposed of by summary judg-
ment in the trial court. To hold that res judicata is a bar 
against plaintiffs in this present suit is to depart from 
the prior holdings of this Court and from the almost unan·-
imous weight of authority from other jurisdictions. 
It is sincerely urged that this Court should reexamine 
the principles underlying its prior holding herein, and 
grant the re-hearing now prayed for. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K. R.OGER BEAN 
BEAN AND BEAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
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